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In the recent case of lZiokle 'v. BZlakman' the Supreme Court
of South Carolina took a giant step forward in the drive to
protect consumers from unfit design in automobiles. The court
recognized a cause of action in negligence against the automo-
bile manufacturer where severe bodily injuries received during
an automobile collision resulted from a defect in design which
was not a causative factor in the accident. The decision repre-
sented a departure from the weight of authority represented by
Evans v. GeneraZ Motors Corp.2 Evans held that a manufac-
turer's duty to make his product reasonably fit for its intended
use did not comprehend collisions. No cause of action could
be found, therefore, when the defective design proved unsafe
onZy in the event of a collision. In Mickle the court, relying
upon Larsen v. Genera2 Motors Corp., expanded the common
law duty of reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to include
collisions, and thereby charted a sensible and realistic course for
this State.
II. TnE DuTr
The duty owed by the manufacturer to the consumer is a
question of law for the court.4 It has been generally acknowl-
edged, especially in the last decade, that the manufacturer's
duty of care toward the consumer includes design of the product.5
There has, however, been a reluctance to impose liability for
design defects for several policy reasons. First, because of mass
production techniques manufacturers would be subjected to a
multiplicity of suits once a design defect was discovered. This
* Mickle v. Blackman, 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969).
1. 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969).
2. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
3. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
4. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1966) ; Kahn
v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677, 678 (S.D. Tex. 1963); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 207 (3d ed. 1964).
5. See, e.g., Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d
Cir. 1954); REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 665 (3d ed. 1964).
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same contention formed a cornerstone of the citadel of privity
and undoubtedly stemmed from the policy consideration of en-
couraging industrial development unimposed by a spate of con-
sumer complaints. Second, there has been reluctance to allow
a jury to second-guess the expertise of scientists and engineers.6
This viewpoint, however, overlooks the fact that in professional
negligence cases expert witnesses actually judge the conduct in
question. As one observer has put it:
The quasi-legal function is transferred from the jury to
the only people who can perform it: the profession
itself. (Of course, the jury has the last word: almost
totally a question of credibility between the witnesses.)7
Third, there has been fear that judgments against manufactur-
ers based on design would necessitate the massive recall of pro-
ducts already on the market, with unfortunate consequences to
manufacturers and their employees.8 This fear has in part been
borne out by the fact that between 1959 and 1966 approximately
8,700,000 automobiles were recalled because of defects.9 While
the larger manufacturers are apparently able to absorb this
added burden, there may be a stronger case for small manu-
facturers.
In one recent article Ralph Nader (co-author), perhaps the
foremost champion of consumer protection in America today,
rejects out of hand these basic policy reasons for reluctance to
impose liability. He realistically maintains that there is nothing
novel about submitting complicated questions to juries. In
automobile design cases, which sometimes involve scientific and
technical matter but which rarely involve extremely complex
matter, judges and juries should be allowed to pass judgment
on the standard of care exercised by experts.10 As to the "flood
of litigation" argument he cites Prosser's statement that "[ilt
is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even
at the expense of a 'flood of litigation', and it is a pitiful con-
fession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to
6. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
7. Curran, A Symposium on Professional Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv.
535, 539 (1959).
8. Noel, supra note 6, at 816.
9. Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 32 ATL
L.J. 52, 65 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Nader & Page, Automobile Design).
10. Id. at 64.
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deny relief on such grounds."' 1 Nader adds to this the con-
sideration that in each case, even though a defect in design be
proved, the plaintiff must also show that the injury resulted
proximately therefrom, and the traditional tort defenses of con-
tributory fault, assumption of the risk, and abnormal use will
be available to the defendant.'2 With regard to the call-back
problem, he points to the illogic of granting immunity from lia-
bility when the manufacture is on a grand scale. It is pre-
cisely then that the risks are most grave and widespread.'8
The manufacturer's duty is stated in substantially the same
terms by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, and the case law. Section 398 of the Restatement
calls for a plan or design which does not make the chattel
"dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured." Section
2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code, prescribing the mini-
mum requirements for merchantability, speaks in terms of fit-
ness "for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."
In the leading cases involving automobile design, the courts
have stated the duty in terms of reasonable fitness for intended
use or purpose.14
Given this language, the courts have focused upon the words
"intended use" in order to determine whether the use or involve-
ment of the product was such as to call into question the manu-
facturer's duty. This approach was explicitly stated in Larsen:
Accepting ... the principle that a manufacturer's
duty of design and construction extends to producing
a product that is reasonably fit for its intended use and
free of hidden defects that could render it unsafe for
such use, the issue narrows on the proper interpreta-
tion of "intended use.'
5
The decisions prior to Larsen uniformly indicated that the
"intended use" of an automobile was nothing more than travel
on the highway, and a cause of action seemingly would not be
found unless the defect were shown to be a causative factor in
11. W. PRossER, HANDBOOx OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 11, at 43 (3d ed.
1964).
12. Nader & Page, Automobile Design, at 64-65.
13. Id. at 65.
14. E.g., Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio
1967) ; Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
15. 391 F.2d at 501.
19691
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the accident. In Carpi v. Pittsburg & TVeirton Bus Co.,16 for
example, recovery was allowed for injuries resulting from a de-
fectively designed pet cock in the undercarriage of a bus which
was disengaged by debris, causing the brakes to drain. As the
E ans court put it, the product involved was unfit for its in-
tended use and in precisely that respect was the cause of acci-
dental injuries.17 On the other hand, in those cases in which the
accidents were caused by outside forces, as in the collision cases
discussed hereafter, the only injuries being caused in whole or in
part by defective design, the courts have found no cause of
action against the manufacturers. The impropriety of this
approach can best be seen by examining the recent decisions on
automobile design.
III. EVANS AND ITS PROGENY
In Evans v. General Motors Corp.8 plaintiff's decedent was
driving across an intersection in a Chevrolet station wagon when
it was struck from the left side by another automobile. The
side of the station wagon, designed with an "X" frame and
therefore not having side frame rails, collapsed inward upon
the decedent, inflicting fatal injuries. The plaintiff's theory
was that since the collision was a foreseeable emergency, the
defendant, by omitting side frame rails, created an unreasonable
risk of harm to users of the automobile. The defendant con-
ceded that it had a duty to design its product to be reasonably
fit for the purpose for which it was made and to be free from
dangerous hidden defects. However, there was no assertion that
the "X" frame was in any way causative of the collision-only
that it allowed the automobile to collapse once it was struck
broadside by another vehicle.
In affirming the ruling of the lower court that no cause of
action had been stated, the Seventh Circuit set forth the ration-
ale which has generally been followed in automobile design
cases: A manufacturer need not "make his automobile accident-
proof or fool-proof; nor must he render the vehicle 'more' safe
where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all." 19
16. 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954).
17. 359 F.2d at 825.
18. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
19. Id. at 824.
Vol. 21
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This proposition was originally enunciated in another context
in Campo v. Scofield.20 In that case the plaintiff complained of
injuries received while operating an "onion topping" machine
which was provided with neither a safety guard nor a stopping
device. During the process of feeding onions into the machine
the plaintiff's hands became caught in its revolving steel rollers
and were badly injured. In sustaining a demurrer, the court
rejected the argument that since rapid development of mechani-
cal contrivances had created so many new dangers, manufactur-
ers should be compelled to equip complicated modern machinery
with all possible protective guards or other safety devices. Such
an extension of the manufacturer's liability was considered to
be solely within the legislative domain.
The objection to the Evans court's reliance on Campo is two-
fold: First, in Campo the danger to be avoided was in fact
obvious (and visible) to all; in Evans the danger to be avoided,
the relative unfitness of the "X" frame, was inconspicuous if
not actually latent; second, the Campo court's refusal to require
the manufacturer to produce a "more" safe product was appar-
ently based upon the obvious non sequitur that to require a
safer or better product is the equivalent of requiring one that
is "accident-proof." This unrealistic approach became no more
persuasive through repetition down the Evans line of cases. The
duty, as stated by the Evans court, was to produce an automo-
bile fit for its intended purpose, but the intended purpose did
not include its participation in collisions with other objects,
despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that
such collisions might occur.2 1
The court seized upon the plaintiff's foreseeability argument
in order to set up and knock down the ludicrous suggestion that
an automobile manufacturer might be required to equip cars
with pontoons because they may foreseeably be driven into
bodies of water. Here the court indulges in refutation by means
of an absurdity-a technique that is clearly out of place in judi-
cial decision-making.
Had the court dealt more honestly with the issue, it would
simply have acknowledged the obvious-that a manufacturer
may be required to conform to a higher but still reasonable
20. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
21. 359 F2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966).
1969]
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standard of safety without incurring a duty to make products
accident-proof. This viewpoint was cogently presented in the
Evans dissent and later adopted by Larsen and Mickle. The
better view is that the duty of an automobile manufacturer
must be stated in the context of traffic realities-i.e., upwards
of 45,000 deaths annually and reported injuries in the hundreds
of thousands from accidents in automobile traffic. The Evans
dissent criticized the majority's failure to state affirmatively
the manufacturer's duty, and proposed that the duty be stated
as this:
[The manufacturer must] use such care in designing its
automobiles that reasonable protection is given pur-
chasers against death and injury from accidents which
are expected and foreseeable yet unavoidable by the
purchaser despite careful use.
22
Thus, in view of the statistical certainty of collisions, and, in
many cases, the absence of fault on the part of accident victims,
the dissent contended that automobile manufacturers should be
duty-bound to take reasonable measures to minimize the ill-
effects of collisions.
The persuasive force of the Evans dissent was lost on the
Southern District Court of Texas in Willis v. Chrysler COorp. 23
There, action was brought for breach of implied warranty of
fitness for intended use against Chrysler Corporation, the man-
ufacturer of a 1963 police car which broke into two sections as
a result of a collision. The court, relying on Evans, held that
the defendant had no duty to design an automobile that could
withstand a high speed collision and "maintain its structural
integrity."2 4 The "no duty to make foolproof" subterfuge of
Evans and Campo was reiterated as authoritative.
In Shumard v. General Motors Corp. 2 5 plaintiff's decedent
was killed when the car in which he was driving erupted into
flames as a result of a collision. The court, denying a cause of
action in either negligence or breach of implied warranty of
fitness, echoed the "fool-proof-accident-proof" refrain and
added to it "no duty to make fireproof." Again focusing on the
22. Id. at 27 (dissenting opinion).
23. 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
24. Id. at 1012.
25. 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
[Vol. 21
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"intended use" language of the stated duty, the court asserted
that the "purposes for which a product is manufactured has
reference to its normal and proper use and not to any use."
26
The court concluded:
[A]n automobile is not made for the purpose of striking
or being struck by other vehicles or objects and ...
the duty of an automobile manufacturer does not in-
clude the duty to design and construct an automobile
which will insure the occupants against injury no
matter how it may be misused or bludgeoned by outside
forces.27
Here the manufacturer was protected by means of the same
sophistry employed in the other automobile design cases. The
court adhered slavishly to the then familiar proposition that to
protect the plaintiff from the specific defect alleged would
require that a perfect car be manufactured-one absolutely
safe for a collision.
Nothing could be more misleading or erroneous. It could not
be seriously contended that a car may be so designed as to pre-
clude any possibility of injury during a collision; a certain
amount of physical punishment necessarily attends such vio-
lence. An automobile manufacturer can, however, protect against
foreseeable and easily avoided injury or enhancement of injury
due to improper design; and he should be under a duty to do so
as are other manufacturers. Reasonable care in automobile design
is no less attainable than reasonable care required by the law
in myriad other undertakings. It is the peculiar bias of the
Evans line of cases that forecloses a middle ground between no
duty, on the one hand, and an absolute or insurer's duty on the
other.
IV. LARSE-THE MIDDLE GROUND
In Larsen v,. GeneraZ Motors Corp.28 the plaintiff alleged
negligence in design and breach of implied warranty of mer-
chantability. He claimed injury as a result of a severe rearward
thrust of the steering mechanism into his head during a head-on
collision. Again, there was no contention that the allegedly de-
fective design in any way caused the accident.
26. Id. at 314.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
1969]
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On these facts, basically indistinguishable from those of the
Evans line of cases, the Eighth Circuit found a cause of action
for negligent design. The court stated that it perceived no
sound reason why the manufacturer should not be held to a
reasonable duty of care in the design of its vehicle consonant
with the state of the ar't29 to minimize the effect of accidents.
The court proceeded on the premise that the user must accept
the normal risk of driving, but he need not be further penalized
by being subjected unnecessarily to a risk of injury due to neg-
ligent design. Addressing itself to the "fool-proof-accident-
proof" argument, the court simply and summarily conceded
that the manufacturer's duty does have its rational limits, based
on principles of foreseeability. A consumer is not legally en-
titled to a perfect car, nor to one that floats on water; he may,
however, be entitled to a better car.
Even the Larsen court's treatment of the troublesome "intend-
ed use" language is not entirely satisfying. The court accepts
the proposition that the manufacturer's duty of design extends
to "producing a product that is reasonably fit for its intended
use . . .,,30 In attempting to expand the scope of "intended
use" to include collisions, the court states:
While automobiles are not made for the purpose of col-
liding with each other, a frequent and inevitable con-
tingency of normal automobile use will result in colli-
sions and injury-producing impacts.31
The quoted language on its face distinguishes between normal
use (which is exactly what is contemplated by the duty) and
a mere "contingency of normal use" (which at least arguably
is not comprehended by the duty). The practical effect of rec-
ognizing, as the court must, that a collision is a contingency
of intended use and not the use itself is to force the court to
step outside the unequivocal language of the duty in order to
reach the desired result-namely, extending the manufacturer's
duty to comprehend foreseeable though unintended incidents of
use. The case's rationale might have been more compelling had
29. Id. at 503. This is an important qualification in view of the inevitability
of rapid scientific and technological advances in the automotive industry. Were
the state of the art at the time of manufacture not taken into account in
determining the question of negligence, producers would often be held to future
standards which they could hardly meet at the time of production.
30. Id. at 501.
31. Id. at 502.
[Vol. 21
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the court rested its decision entirely on the general common law
duty of a manufacturer to eliminate any unreasonable risk of
foreseeable harm from his product.
One further observation should be made with respect to the
stated duty. In both Evans and Larsen the court stated the duty
in terms of "fitness for intended use" and then resolved the case
by adjudging that a collision was or was not an intended use.
It seems, however, that the crucial question was not whether a
collision was an intended use-obviously a collision is not a use,
much less an intended use-but "rather whether an automobile
could realistically be considered fit for normal use if the jolt
from a collision would render it a death-trap. If, for example,
an automobile were so constructed that the impact of a bicycle
would cause it to fold, or if a ship were so made that a slight
contact with a wharf would cause it to sink, it should be no
answer that a car is not made for the purpose of being struck,
or that the intended use of a ship is not bouncing off wharves.
The intended use of a car is travel on the highway; but travel
on the highway really means travel through peril. Thus, if the
manufacturer's duty is to be stated in terms of intended use, the
appropriate question for the court is whether the car was reas-
onably fit for perilous travel.
V. M1IcK
In lickle v. Blackman3 2 the plaintiff, a passenger in a 1949
Ford, was thrown during a collision against a defectively de-
signed gear shift lever knob 33 which shattered upon impact,
causing her to be impaled upon it. With the divergent results
of Larsen and Evans before it, the South Carolina Supreme
Court recognized a cause of action against the defendant Ford
Motor Company for negligent design.3 4  Although relying
32. 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969).
33. The ball, which covered a gear shift lever that tapered to a diameter
of 5/16 of an inch, was force-fitted and could not be removed without ruptur-
ing it. The evidence indicated that the white tennite butyrate knob used by
Ford in its 1949 model was subject to rapid deterioration from exposure to
the ultraviolet rays of sunlight. The hairline cracks which developed on the
surface in this process destroyed the force distributing quality of the knob and
caused it to shatter easily on impact. There was no evidence that the black
knobs, to which Ford switched for its 1950 model, deteriorated with age or
normal use.
34. The case was reversed and remanded on other grounds as to defendant
Ford Motor Co. Viewed in its full complexity the case is of interest because
of a number of complex questions, including instructions given to the jury on
1969]
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heavily on Larsen) the South Carolina court avoided the "in-
tended use" quagmire and grounded its decision solidly upon
the traditional common law duty to use reasonable care to
avoid foreseeable harm. As the court stated:
By ordinary negligence standards, a known risk of
harm raises a duty of commensurate care. We perceive
no reason in logic or law why an automobile manufac-
turer should be exempt from this duty.35
With regard to the "intended use" pitfall, the court noted
that the Evans court was divided on whether to give controlling
weight to the concept of safety for intended use as the limit
of the defendant's obligation of care (the majority), or to find
a duty to exercise care to furnish reasonable protection to col-
lision victims, applying elementary negligence principles, in the
statistical certainty that there would be many such victims (the
dissent). Adopting the latter approach, the South Carolina
court effectively bridged the gap between the common law neg-
ligence principle of "reasonable foreseeability" and the "in-
tended use" test used repeatedly in products liability cases. The
court quoted from Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc.:36
"Intended use" is but a convenient adaptation of the
basic test of "reasonable foreseeability" framed to more
specifically fit the factual situations out of which arise
questions of a manufacturer's liability for negligence.
"Intended use" is not an inflexible formula to be
apodictically applied to every case. Normally a seller
or manufacturer is entitled to anticipate that the pro-
duct he deals in will be used only for the purposes for
which it is manufactured and sold; thus he is expected
to reasonably foresee only injuries arising in the course
of such use.
However, he must also be expected to anticipate the en-
vironment which is normal for the use of his product
the question of the manufacturer's duty, the factor of prolonged safe use (13
years) of the product, the alleged superseding negligence of the car owner for
not replacing the knob even though the hairline cracks were patent, alleged
excessiveness of the verdict ($312,000), and the surprising after-discovered
evidence that the paraplegic plaintiff, subsequent to the trial, married and gave
birth to a normal baby girl.
35. 166 S.E.2d 173, 185 (S.C. 1969).
36. 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962). In this case a 14-month-old infant suffered
chemical pneumonia as the result of ingestion of a small quantity of inherently
dangerous furniture polish which gave insufficient warning of danger.
[Vol. 2
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and ...he must anticipate the reasonably foreseeable
risks of the use of his product in such environment.
These are risks which are inherent in the proper use for
which his product is manufactured.
1
VI. CoCLcUsIoN
The more conservative courts may continue to protect auto-
mobile manufacturers by seeking the "intended use" refuge and
by refusing to require the production of so-called "fool-proof"
cars. Those courts, however, that have pinned their reluctance
to expand the manufacturer's duty on want of precedent, now
have a clear choice of directions and need not be thwarted by the
technicalities of a variously stated duty. The South Carolina
Supreme Court has enunciated with commendable clarity the
better rule regarding the manufacturer's duty toward consumers
-he must use reasonable care to design unreasonable risks out
of his products.
HYMAN RuBiN, JR.
37. Id. at 83-84, quoted in Mickle at 187.
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